We Didn\u27t Start the Fire...And We Won\u27t Pay to Stop It: Financing Wildfire Management in America\u27s Wildland-Urban Interface by Trego, Garrett D.
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume 36 (2011-2012) 
Issue 2 Article 9 
February 2012 
We Didn't Start the Fire...And We Won't Pay to Stop It: Financing 
Wildfire Management in America's Wildland-Urban Interface 
Garrett D. Trego 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Garrett D. Trego, We Didn't Start the Fire...And We Won't Pay to Stop It: Financing Wildfire 
Management in America's Wildland-Urban Interface, 36 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 595 
(2012), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol36/iss2/9 
Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr 
WE DIDN’T START THE FIRE . . . AND WE WON’T PAY
TO STOP IT: FINANCING WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT
IN AMERICA’S WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE
GARRETT D. TREGO*
INTRODUCTION
Just seven miles west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado, and in plain
view from Interstate 70, the South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain,
originally ignited by a lightning strike,1 trapped and killed fourteen brave,
heroic wildland firefighters in July of 1994.2 In a single moment, a once
small, tame fire “spotted” and began to burn in the canyon, behind and
immediately downhill from the firefighters working along the steep can-
yon slope.3 One hundred-foot flames whirled out of control in the uphill
winds and ran up the Gambel Oak–covered slope, engulfing the fleeing
firefighters in flames just yards before they reached the safety of the
mountain peak.4
The frightening thing about this incident was not just that there
were fatalities, but that so many firefighters were killed fighting a
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School 2012; B.A., Hampden-Sydney College 2008.
The author would like to thank the ELPR staff for their hard work on this publication, as
well as his friends and family for their constant support throughout law school, especially
Meredith, Mom, Jamie, and Drew for making these three years and my lifetime as mean-
ingful and fun as they have been. Considerable thanks also to Jimmy, Champa, and Rags
for teaching me a great deal about wildfire and the Forest Service. The experience that I
had working with y’all was one of the most memorable and rewarding of my life and inspired
me to write this Note.
1 BRET W. BUTLER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., RESEARCH PAPER RMRS-
RP-9, FIRE BEHAVIOR ASSOCIATED WITH THE 1994 SOUTH CANYON FIRE ON STORM KING
MOUNTAIN, COLORADO 1, 2 fig.1, 3 (1998).
2 Id. at 1.
3 Id. at 4–5. The report created by the U.S. Forest Service notes that twelve firefighters
were killed in a single sweep on one face of the mountain. Id. at 5. They could not outrun
the flames running up a very steep slope at speeds as fast as six to nine feet per second. Id.
The two additional deaths resulted from a similar blowout, overrunning a narrow gulley
in which the two firefighters were working. Id.
4 SAFE FIRE PROGRAMS, & FOREST STEWARDSHIP CONCEPTS, SOUTH CANYON FIRE: TEN
YEAR REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PLANNED ACTIONS 3 (2004) [hereinafter SAFE
FIRE PROGRAMS]; BUTLER, supra note 1, at 44.
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relatively small fire.5 This catastrophe marked a low point in modern
American fire suppression history;6 it was a notable failure to achieve the
primary goal of United States wildland firefighting: to protect human life.7
Though catastrophes like the one on Storm King Mountain in 1994 are
rare, a number of Americans lose their lives to wildfire almost every year.8
As patterns of residential and commercial development push further into
our nation’s wildlands9 and rapidly increasing numbers of people choose
to live, work, and recreate on lands directly adjacent to or very near to
federal and state forests,10 the danger to human life, of firefighters and
civilians, and to personal property, has increased exponentially.11
The South Canyon Fire did not stop burning after it engulfed
fourteen firefighters; it continued to burn toward Glenwood Springs,
Colorado.12 Despite the risk shifting from federal and state lands to pri-
vate property as fires burn towards civilization, the cost, for the most
part, remains on the federal and state governments to fight these fires.13
After thirty-four firefighters lost their lives in the 1994 American fire
season, the fire community rewrote the rule book on fire safety, reaffirming
the emphasis on the primary goal of wildland firefighting, human safety.14
5 When the fire was declared controlled on July 11, 1994, it had burned about 2115 acres.
BUTLER, supra note 1, at 50. More firefighters died by burnover on this fire than on any other
fire since 1990. See NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., WILDLAND FIREFIGHTER FATALITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990–2006 10 (2007) [hereinafter FIREFIGHTER FATALITIES].
6 See FIREFIGHTER FATALITIES, supra note 5, at 10. See generally SAFE FIRE PROGRAMS,
supra note 4 (marking an extensive set of fire safety policy changes that went into effect
as a result of the 1994 South Canyon Fire).
7 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE
MANAGEMENT: POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW 4 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 POLICY & PROGRAM
REVIEW].
8 See generally FIREFIGHTER FATALITIES, supra note 5.
9 See Federico Cheever, The Phantom Menace and the Real Cause: Lessons from Colorado’s
Hayman Fire 2002, 18 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 193 (2010) (detailing the migration of
the population after World War II into the “lost frontier,” driven by tax deductions, a new
federal highway system, and the availability of land along the wildland-urban interface).
10 See STEPHEN J. PYNE ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO WILDLAND FIRE 266–67 (2d ed. 1996).
11 See 1995 POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 7, at 7–8 (noting that as organic mate-
rials continue to build up after years of large-scale fire suppression, fires will continue
to burn hotter, longer, more intensely, and cover greater areas).
12 See BUTLER, supra note 1, at 50 & fig.37.
13 See ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33990, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR WILDFIRE
CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT 13 (2010) [hereinafter GORTE 2010] (“[The unclear nature of
wildfire funding] has led to increasing reliance by homeowners and local governments on
federal fire protection . . . .”).
14 See 1995 POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 7, at iii; CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE
PROT., CALIFORNIA FIRE SIEGE FIRE EVENTS AND POLICY: FIRE EVENTS AND POLICY, available
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The secondary goal of firefighting is to protect valuable property on both
public and private lands.15 With the costs of accomplishing this goal higher
than ever and certain to continue to climb,16 it is now time to rewrite the
policy of the secondary goal.
This Note argues that the undisputed rise in wildfire risk across
the United States coupled with developer and landowner awareness of
this risk warrants a shift of wildfire-related costs to those properties that
receive the most benefit from government wildfire services. The intention
of this Note is to suggest possible cost-shifting implementation methods
and examine their feasibility. The goals of implementation include: (1) shift
a greater proportion of wildfire costs to those living in the wildland-urban
interface (“WUI”) who are most responsible for aggravating wildfire costs
and who actively receive the most benefit from governmental protection;
(2) deter irresponsible sprawl and development patterns into our nation’s
wildlands by reducing reliance on existing federal programs for wildfire
protection; (3) increase the availability of funds for wildfire prevention and
forest health restoration spending, not allowing suppression costs to take
away from other federal agency wildfire and land management programs;
(4) reduce the debts of cash-strapped state and federal governments.
In Part I, this Note explains the historical and present relationship
of the United States and wildfire management, detailing how and why the
current problems have occurred and addressing the three main sources of
increasing wildfire frequency, severity, and costs: climate change, historical
suppression tactics, and the growth of the WUI. This Note will explain how
these factors and the relationship of state, federal, and local governments
have created a trend of rising and insurmountable costs for wildfire fund-
ing of state and especially federal agencies. Part II details the current cost
structure of wildfire funding in the United States. Part III examines how
state and federal agencies share responsibility for many wildfire costs, and
shows that the structure leaves the federal government with the ultimate
responsibility for the largest costs.
Finally, Part IV describes four policy options for implementation,
varying in their potential cost to the property owner and their overall effec-
tiveness in creating a sustainable relationship between the United States
and wildfire within its borders. The Note concludes with an analysis of the
at http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire_protection/downloads/siege/2007/Overview_FireEvents&Policy
.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
15 See 1995 POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 7, at 6 (relying on firefighters on the
ground to make decisions on property protection based on “relative values to be protected,
commensurate with fire management costs”).
16 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 1, 3–4.
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feasibility of each of these four options, ultimately depicting the difficult
political and judicial environment that disaster-related legislation must
fight through in an attempt to protect the nation from overwhelming fi-
nancial and physical losses in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Wildfire Policy in the United States
As the United States continued to expand westward after the turn
of the twentieth century, forest fire became a great danger to the mani-
fest destiny of expansion and settlement of the modern, lower forty-eight
United States.17 After briefly toying with the idea of empowering the Army
to fight wildfire, the federal government created the Bureau of Forestry
in 1905, the predecessor of the U.S. Forest Service, and charged it as the
preeminent wildfire-fighting agency in the United States.18 Though there
have been a number of public and private organizations with varying fire
management policies, fire historian Stephen J. Pyne assures that if you
“[t]rack the pathways of Forest Service fire programs, . . . you trace out
the national saga.”19
While the tactics of the Forest Service were debated in its early
years, the summer of 1910 shaped the policy for the next century.20 In
1910, fires burned across the Western United States with a frequency
and intensity that no one in the Forest Service had ever seen.21 During
that summer over five million acres were burned, creating an inferno
that killed at least seventy-eight people.22 Out of necessity and a sense of
17 See Alison Berry, Forest Policy Up in Smoke: Fire Suppression in the United States, PROP.
& ENVTL. RES. CTR. (Sept. 2007), at 4, http://www.perc.org/pdf/Forest%20Policy%20Up%20in
%20Smoke.pdf.
18 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 246–47.
19 Id. at 247.
20 See Wildfire Management in the U.S. Forest Service: A Brief History, NAT. HAZARDS
OBSERVER, July 2005, at 1 [hereinafter A Brief History].
21 See id.
22 Id. When the newly formed Forest Service discovered fires, ignited by lightning deep in
the wilderness across the nation, it began to fight them with all its resources, calling on the
army for aid and hiring almost any man to labor on the ground crews across the Western
States. See STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WILDLAND AND
RURAL FIRE 243, 251 (Princeton Univ. Press 1982). With the experience of the blowup of
1910 under their belts, surviving what they called a “holocaust,” Forest Service leaders
scoffed at the idea of allowing fire to freely burn beneficially in certain areas around the
nation. See id. at 251.
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obligation and pride,23 the Forest Service began to aggressively fight for-
est fire, attempting to put out any wildfire as soon as possible, regardless
of its location or its potential to lead to loss of human life or loss of valuable
property.24 With an overwhelming amount of resources, the Forest Service
was extremely successful in suppressing fire for many years.25 Not until
the 1970s did the Forest Service and other agencies begin to perform re-
search and discover the effects of removing fire from an environment that
had become dependent on fire.26 During the same era, it became glaringly
evident that on many occasions, the government was spending far more
money suppressing fire than it stood to gain from the unburned landscape
that it was so tenaciously defending.27
A change in policy came in the 1970s, not because of the adverse
effects that fire deprivation was having on American forests, but because
the cost of suppressing fire was becoming too great for the federal gov-
ernment to bear.28 It became clear that as annual expenditures on sup-
pression continued to rise, the annual area burned was remaining the
same, or even increasing.29 Though there was some movement toward the
use of controlled burning to simulate the missing positive impact that
fire had on ecosystems, the movement lost steam when high-profile pre-
scribed burns escaped fire managers’ control and cost the nation dearly—
financially and through the loss of life.30
Wildland fire policy in the twenty-first century has progressed
significantly, but it is still a product of the failed policies of the twentieth
23 See PYNE, supra note 22, at 295. In 1929, the Forest Protection Board issued this
statement: “All forests under federal ownership of jurisdiction should be protected from
destruction by fire. . . . [sic] As the owner of property, the Federal Government is morally
if not legally charged with the duty not to maintain a nuisance.” Id.
24 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 1. The original Forest Service policy was known as
the “10:00 a.m. policy” which was based around the goal of having any forest fire contained
by 10:00 a.m. the next morning, working during the cool hours of night while the fire was
in its early stages. See id. at 1–2.
25 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 248. From the origins of the Forest Service’s aggres-
sive suppression policy through the 1960s, the agency had a surplus of resources from vary-
ing sources: the money of the Firefighting Fund Act of 1908, the manpower of the Civilian
Conservation Corps and other New Deal agencies, and the surplus mechanical power given
to the Forest Service from the military. See id.
26 See A Brief History, supra note 20, at 2.
27 See id. at 1–2 (explaining that the original fire suppression policy was created to protect
what was at that time one of America’s great economic resources, its timber reserves).
28 See A Brief History, supra note 20, at 2.
29 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 260–61.
30 See id. at 85–89; A Brief History, supra note 20, at 2–3.
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century.31 Though financing troubles remain, especially the need to offset
suppression costs, the Forest Service and other branches of the federal gov-
ernment are placing a greater emphasis on fire prevention and preser-
vation of ecosystems through prescribed fire and mechanized treatments,
like thinning and the creation of fire breaks, that aim to create healthier
forests and less intense fires.32
B. Fuel Buildup and Increasing Wildfire Frequency
Historically, wildfires in the United States occurred naturally by
lightning strike, but as our population has grown, the number of human-
caused wildfires has increased extraordinarily.33 Today, far more wildfires
are ignited by humans, by both arson and negligence, than are caused nat-
urally by lightning.34 For a number of reasons in addition to direct human
ignition, fires are occurring more often and are burning more intensely
than ever when they do occur.35
Many ecosystems in the American West have not only adapted to
fire, but their healthy growth has even become dependent on fire in some
cases.36 Key plant species have developed positive responsive traits to fire:
growing more quickly in the years following a fire, releasing dormant
buds and subterranean growths after fire, and increasing seed release
from spores due to fire.37 Some conifers, like the lodgepole pine, rely on
the heat from fire to crack the serotinous seed coats of their seeds to
allow for germination.38 In addition to its direct benefits, wildfire also
31 See A Brief History, supra note 20, at 3 (explaining the Forest Service’s recent attempts
at beginning to restore the health of fire-deprived forests).
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., FIRE AND AVIATION MANAGEMENT FISCAL YEAR
2009 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 18 (2010).
33 See Lightning vs. Human-Caused Fires and Acres, NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., http://
www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_lightng.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
34 See id. (providing a recorded data list from 2001 to 2010 of the number of fires caused
by lightning and by humans and showing the ultimate acreage burnt by fires from each
source). From 2001 to 2010 there were 653,650 wildfires caused by humans in the United
States and only 111,600 caused by lightning. See id.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 40–62.
36 See NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., NATIONAL WILDFIRE COORDINATING GROUP:
COMMUNICATOR’S GUIDE FOR WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT: FIRE EDUCATION,
PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION PRACTICES 2.11, available at http://www.nifc.gov
/PUBLICATIONS/communicators_guide/2%20Wildland%20fire%20overview.PDF (last
visited Feb. 2, 2012).
37 See id. at 2.11–.18 (detailing specific fire-dependent ecosystem regions in the United
States).
38 See id. at 2.12, 2.15; see also PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 210–11.
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restores minerals to the soil as it burns organic plant matter, aiding
future growth.39
Lodgepole pine forests, which cover much of the Rocky Mountains
and high-elevation areas of the Western United States,40 serve as an
excellent case study to show the effects of fire removal from a thriving
ecosystem. “High-intensity crown fire initiates lodgepole pine regener-
ation in the Rocky Mountains.”41 In serotinous plant species, like the
lodgepole pine, “when seeds become mature, they are retained by the
parent because the cones do not open. The cones are sealed shut with
surface resin and the seeds remain viable because the vascular water
connection is intact.”42 This ecosystem adapted to infrequent, intense
crown fires that occur on average every 200 to 300 years.43 When fire
finally occurs, decades of viable seeds are released.44 “Because seeds fall
on a substrate that is conducive to successful germination and seedling
establishment, widespread postfire regeneration results.”45 Other ecosys-
tems across the country developed similar adaptations that depend on
fire to flourish and remain healthy, including, “southwestern California
chaparral, midwest tallgrass prairie, and various pine stands of the
Southwest, Rocky Mountains and Southeast.”46
The success of the Forest Service at eliminating fire from the
American landscape throughout much of the twentieth century denied
forests a valuable asset. As a result of this denial, American forests have
become extremely thick and overgrown.47 Tree and other plant species have
suffered from this overgrowth, becoming more susceptible to parasites48
39 See NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., supra note 36, at 2.16; see also PYNE ET AL., supra
note 10, at 191–96 (providing a more nuanced analysis of varying effects that fire may
have on an ecosystem’s soil makeup).
40 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 210–11.
41 Id. at 211.
42 Id. at 186–87.
43 See id. at 210.
44 See id.
45 Id.
46 See ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAND USE INST., WILDFIRE HAZARD IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN
INTERFACE 1, available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/rmlui/sustainable-development
/Wildlfires-in-the-Urban-Interface.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
47 See Marvin Dodge, Forest Fuel Accumulation: A Growing Problem, 177 SCI. 139, 139
(1972) (arguing that fire suppression agencies’ own efficiency is their greatest enemy
because it does not allow fires to burn off dead underbrush, which creates more intense
and faster-moving wildfires).
48 See id. at 140; see, e.g., STATE OF COLO., THE 2009 REPORT ON THE HEALTH OF COLORADO’S
FORESTS: THREATS TO CURRENT AND FUTURE FOREST RESOURCES 7–13 (2010), available at
http://csfs.colostate.edu/pdfs/105504_CSFS_09-Forest-Health_www.pdf (documenting the
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and fire.49 Unhealthy forests with very thick, dead underbrush and more
dead or bare and unhealthy trees tightly packed together are more easily
ignited and they create the fuel that allows fires to burn more intensely
for longer periods of time across greater distances.50 Ultimately, the mis-
takes of our own national wildfire agencies have created the fuel buildup
partially responsible for the recent increase in wildfire activity.
C. Climate Change
Compounding the land use and fire management mistakes of the
last century, climate change in the United States has created longer fire
seasons, drier conditions, and ushered in an era of more intense fire be-
havior since the 1980s.51 According to A. L. Westerling’s study, climate
change has had the greatest effect on fires in the Rocky Mountains and
other higher elevation forests, but data also shows climate change cau-
sation in California, Oregon, Washington, and many other non–Rocky
Mountain states.52 Westerling argues that climate change may have
greater causation for the recent escalation in Western fires than the land
use “mistakes” made by fire managers throughout the twentieth century.53
severe problem created by the Mountain Pine Beetle, a boring parasite responsible for
killing whole stands of trees throughout the Rocky Mountain area, especially in Colorado).
Not only is susceptibility to these parasites raised by the overgrowth and poor health of
the forest: many believe the high number of dead trees in certain areas creates severe fire
danger and more intense fire. See Editorial, Science Should Lead Pine Beetle Epidemic
Solutions, CASPER STAR-TRIB. (Oct. 3, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://trib.com/news/opinion/editorial
/article_f87d7db9-ed2a-5620-8d66-20556935c592.html.
49 See Dodge, supra note 47, at 139–40 (explaining that unhealthy trees and increased
amounts of underbrush or “ladder fuels” create higher fire danger and greater fire
intensity).
50 See 1995 POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 7, at 7. See generally ROSS W. GORTE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21880, WILDFIRE PROTECTION IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN
INTERFACE (2004) [hereinafter GORTE 2004] (acknowledging the effect of increased veg-
etation levels spreading and intensifying wildfire, but challenging current community
wildfire prevention methods around structures).
51 See A. L. Westerling et al., Warming and Earlier Spring Increase Western U.S. Forest
Wildfire Activity, 313 SCI. 940, 942–43 (2006).
52 See id. at 941 (noting that the greatest effect was in the Rockies, the area which ac-
counts for sixty percent of the late twentieth century rise in large fires). But see Torching
the Forest Fire Myth, WORLD CLIMATE REP. (Apr. 25, 2007) http://www.worldclimatereport
.com/index.php/2007/04/25/torching-the-forest-fire-myth/ (using evidence from a tree ring
study to show that perhaps the current level of acreage burnt is more akin to the numbers
in the 1800s and 1900s, questioning early methods of record-keeping and ultimately ques-
tioning whether climate change is indeed a cause of increasing wildfire).
53 See Westerling et al., supra note 51, at 943.
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Between 1987 and 2003, the average length of the wildfire season
(the time between the first and last reported fire of the year) increased
sixty-four percent, by seventy-eight days, compared to the average season
from 1970 to 1986.54 Westerling’s study also showed that seventy-two per-
cent of acreage burned in the United States occurred in “early snowmelt”
years.55 The average temperatures from 1987 to 2003 were 0.87°C higher
than those in the preceding period from 1970 to 1986, and seventy-three
percent of “early [snowmelt] years” between 1970 and 2003 occurred in
the latter half, from 1987 to 2003.56 The data shows that since the 1980s,
these rising average temperatures have shortened the snow cover season,
releasing moisture to lower elevations more quickly and thus creating
longer periods of dry conditions later in the fire season.57 The data also
shows higher temperatures, drier vegetation, longer fire seasons, and ear-
lier snowmelts having a strong correlation with the increased fire activ-
ity since the 1980s.58 Westerling argues that if global warming is THE
cause of increased fire activity, it is senseless to fight it with preventative
measures aimed at righting the fire management processes of the early
twentieth century;59 however, if, as many scholars believe,60 global warm-
ing has combined with the failed fire management policies to cause the
extreme spike in fire activity, then the solution must take both causes
into account.61
No matter the cause, it is clear that the frequency and intensity
of wildfire have increased severely since the 1980s,62 and the cost to gov-
ernments is shooting through the roof.
54 Id. at 941.




59 Westerling et al., supra note 51, at 940.
60 See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE FORESTERS, 2009–2010 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE
FORESTERS ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2010), available at http://www.stateforesters.org/files
/2010-NASF-AnnualReport.pdf (noting the creation of the Forest Climate Working Group
to advocate for the protection of forests related to global warming legislation or action).
61 See Westerling et al., supra note 51, at 940. Westerling concludes that global warming
may have a greater effect on higher-altitude forests that have a history of only sporadic,
extreme fire, while fire management policy may have a greater effect on lower-altitude
forests accustomed to regular brush level, less intense fires. Id.
62 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 2 (showing a range of data with a sharp increase in
number of acres burned since the mid-1980s). In 2006 and 2007 over nine million acres
were burned each year, the highest levels ever recorded. See id. at 22.
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D. The Wildland-Urban Interface
Analyzing the increasing costs of fire suppression based on fire’s
increased frequency and intensity alone would be a mistake. Another im-
portant factor contributing to skyrocketing suppression costs, and the
frequency and intensity of wildfire, is the residential and commercial de-
velopment of lands very near to state and national forests and rangelands.
As development pushes towards every last frontier in America, it creates
a very difficult land conflict and forces wildland firefighters to defend
homes and other private structures.63 In the developmental stages of the
Forest Service, it adopted as its main fire-related objectives to protect
human life and to protect valuable property.64 Through this policy and the
nature of the agency’s development,65 it established itself as the agency
predominantly responsible for the protection of vast federal forests and
resources.66 Other state and federal agencies followed the lead of the
Forest Service in developing land management strategies that reflected
the competing demands of governmental and private actors along the
wildland-urban interface.67
By the late twentieth century, the public had grown skeptical of the
Forest Service’s work with prescribed fires68 and human-supported fires
in wilderness areas.69 Despite their value in ecosystem management,
63 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 267.
64 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 1.
65 Through the first seventy years of the twentieth century, the Forest Service was blessed
with a surplus of resources: bottomless financing, a large increase of labor from the New
Deal, and even more labor and machinery after World War II. See A Brief History, supra
note 20, at 1–2.
66 PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 247.
67 See id. (“The Forest Service . . . established the basis for a national system of fire
management.”). Other state and national organizations focused more on other aspects
of land management, but the cooperation seen today is due to coordination in wildfire
management and the lead of the Forest Service. See id.
68 Prescribed fire or controlled burning is a method of fuel reduction and simulation of
natural fire behavior in fire-starved forests. See id. at 405–06. Fire managers will inten-
tionally set these fires in a controlled area, monitoring the fire to only burn in that area,
reducing the fuel load and restoring some of the beneficial effects of fire to fire-deprived
areas. Id.
69 PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 266; see also id. at 87–89. This section details the
Yellowstone-area fires of 1988. Pyne points to this fire season, the most “extensive” fires
since 1910, as the one that solidified public unrest with the new “let it burn” philosophy
of fire managers. Id. at 87. Many of the fires began as prescribed fires, but when a
drought hit the area that summer, the fires roared out of control, burning sixty-five per-
cent of the perimeter of Yellowstone National Park and destroying tree stands as old as
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prescribed fires became a growing problem, often times spreading to near-
by towns and homes.70 Escaped prescribed fires highlight the growing
difficulty in protecting structures adjacent to state and federal lands, not
only from prescribed fire, but, more frequently, from naturally ignited
wildfire as well.71 This problem is the hallmark issue in a new era of fire
management, namely “intermix fire” or “wildland/urban interface fire.”72
The WUI is “the fastest growing category of real estate in
America.”73 It can be defined loosely as “the area where houses and
wildland vegetation coincide,”74 or perhaps more fittingly, “where com-
bustible homes meet combustible vegetation.”75 Though the definition
may be broad, according to one current designation, 9.4% of all land in
the United States is designated as part of the WUI.76 The area includes
thirty-nine percent of all housing units in the United States, a total of
forty-four million homes.77 There are more total homes in the WUI in the
eastern states where fire is less of a problem; however, a higher percentage
of homes in western fire-prone states fall within this designation than the
percentage of homes in eastern states.78 A year 2000 report found that
11,000 communities adjacent to federal lands in the American West are
500 years. Id. at 88. For a further report on the severity of the 1988 fire season around
Yellowstone National Park, see NAT’L PARK SERV., THE YELLOWSTONE FIRES OF 1988 (2008),
available at http://www.nps.gov/yell/naturescience/upload/firesupplement.pdf.
70 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 267.
71 See id.
72 Id.
73 Jamison Colburn, The Fire Next Time: Land Use Planning in the Wildland/Urban
Interface, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 223, 240 (2008).
74 See Susan I. Stewart et al., The Wildland-Urban Interface in the United States, in U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., THE PUBLIC AND WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT: SOCIAL
SCIENCE FINDINGS FOR MANAGERS 197, 197, 201 (Sarah McCaffrey tech. ed., 2006) (noting
that the federal definition errs on the side of inclusion for the sake of a report in the
Federal Register, including incorporated municipalities, defined as “vicinity,” that may
be as far away from public lands as 2.4 kilometers, or 1.5 miles).
75 GORTE 2004, supra note 50, at 1 (quoting U.S. FOREST SERV. ET AL., WILDFIRE STRIKES
HOME!: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WILDLAND URBAN FIRE PROTECTION CONFERENCE
2 (1987)).
76 Stewart et al., supra note 74, at 197; see also Colburn, supra note 73, at 241.
77 Colburn, supra note 73, at 241.
78 Stewart et al., supra note 74, at 198–99. Attempting to gain the most effective
information, Stewart’s research team used 2.4 kilometers, or about 1.5 miles, as the
measure of proximity necessary for a structure to be included in the designated area.
This distance is the maximum distance a fire brand has been known to travel with the
ability to land on the roof of a structure and start a fire. Id. at 201.
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at a high risk of wildfire.79 As the nation moves closer to the wilderness,80
the pressure of urban sprawl pushing up against overgrown, overheated,
and unhealthy forests creates incredible danger and high combustibility.81
As Pyne states: “Historically, most disastrous fires break out during times
of transition. The intermix [WUI] era is that, certainly. . . . [T]he extended
urban and the resurgent wildland each persist, the transition suspended,
both elements arcing fire across their shared landscape.”82
As sprawl pushes further into highly combustible areas, human
presence and man-made structures make fire increasingly difficult to
fight.83 Additionally, increased presence leads to more human-caused
wildfires from campgrounds, suburban areas, and residences.84 Even a
small fire that starts in a wildland-urban interface zone can immediately
threaten multiple homes and other structures.85 The presence of homes
and structures in wilderness areas can create a number of problems for
firefighters: the structures may be more flammable than the natural eco-
system, they may help spread the fire, and they may interfere with con-
trolled burning, cutting, or other preventative projects.86 Most importantly,
the federal government is often called upon to protect these private lands.87
Though it is hard, if not impossible, to collect data in order to
determine how much of an effect urban sprawl and the expanding WUI
has had on the frequency, intensity, and cost of wildfire suppression in
the United States, it is clear to most foresters that these factors have had
a positive correlative relationship with each other in recent years. One re-
cent study used FASTRACS (Fuel Analysis, Smoke Tracking, and Report
Access Computer System) to conclude that prescribed burning and me-
chanical thinning projects along the WUI “consistently exhibited higher
79 SEC’Y OF AGRIC. ET AL., A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH FOR REDUCING WILDLAND FIRE RISKS
TO COMMUNITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 10-YEAR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY 4 (2001).
80 See SARAH E. JENSEN & GUY R. MCPHERSON, LIVING WITH FIRE: FIRE ECOLOGY AND
POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 47 (2008) [hereinafter LIVING WITH FIRE]; see, e.g.,
Cheever, supra note 9, at 193 (stating that Colorado, like most southwestern states, has
seen rapid overall growth (3.1% annually from 1990 to 2000) and even more rapid growth
in the WUI (4.6% annually)).
81 See PYNE ET AL., supra note 10, at 267.
82 Id.
83 See LIVING WITH FIRE, supra note 80, at 47.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 47–48.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 48–49.
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treatment costs for both prescribed fire and mechanical treatments.”88
When fire approaches private homes and structures, the fire managers
lose their ability to let the fire burn.89 In addition to suppression costs,
governments are spending a large portion of wildfire funds on defending
the WUI through prevention techniques (prescribed burning, cutting,
and clearing).90
The Forest Service and other federal government agencies are
charged with protecting federal lands;91 however, agencies believe they
are burdened with a much higher duty. In a November 2006 report from
the Inspector General of the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”), the USDA stated that:
Forest Service’s (FS) wildfire suppression costs have
exceeded $1 billion in 3 of the past 6 years. [The Forest
Service’s] escalating cost to fight fires is largely due to
its efforts to protect private property in the wildland urban
interface (WUI) bordering FS lands. Homeowner reliance
on the Federal government to provide wildfire suppression
services places an enormous financial burden on FS, as
the lead Federal agency providing such services.92
The residents93 of communities that are benefitting from these
enormous expenditures are getting a free ride to live in a very dangerous,
88 Hayley Hesseln & Alison H. Berry, The Effect of the Wildland-Urban Interface on
Prescribed Burning Costs in the Pacific Northwestern United States, in U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., FOREST SERV., PSW-GTR-208, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON FIRE ECONOMICS, PLANNING, AND POLICY: A GLOBAL VIEW 339, 339
(Armando González-Cabán tech. coordinator, 2008).
89 See LIVING WITH FIRE, supra note 80, at 49.
90 See Karen M. Bradshaw, A Modern Overview of Wildfire Law, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 445, 455 (2010) (noting that the Forest Service resources have largely been put
towards firefighting, with “other areas” losing funding to “fire suppression efforts”). But
see Colburn, supra note 73, at 242–43 (arguing that preventative fuel reduction work
creates a never-ending cycle of human labor that can never hope to reach all areas of
dangerously overgrown forest).
91 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. W. REGION, REP. NO. 08601-44-SF,
AUDIT REPORT: FOREST SERVICE: LARGE FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS 1 (2006) [hereinafter
2006 AUDIT REPORT].
92 Id. at i.
93 Bradshaw recognizes three types of WUI landowners: governmental owners, small
private landowners, and institutional landowners. See Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 451–52.
While attention is typically focused on the government and small private owners in the
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yet beautiful and attractive, residential setting.94 The Federal government,
as well as state governments,95 are subsidizing residential growth into
areas they will soon be unable to protect. Federal agencies’ policy is to pro-
tect any valuable structures over timberland or uninhabited land, even
if it means sacrificing control of a fire or spending more money to protect
the structures than “100% of the rebuilding cost.”96 This policy creates an
impossible burden on the federal government. The Inspector General goes
on to plead that:
It also removes incentives for landowners moving into the
WUI to take responsibility for their own protection and en-
sure their homes are constructed and landscaped in ways
that reduce wildfire risks. Assigning more financial respon-
sibility to State and local government for WUI wildfire pro-
tection is critical because Federal agencies do not have the
power to regulate WUI development. Zoning and planning
authority rests entirely with State and local governments.97
Though state and local governments may argue that it was the
historic federal suppression policies that created many of the problems
associated with wildfire suppression today, it was likely an amalgam-
ation of variables that stoked the inferno of rising suppression costs. Fault
appears to lie at all levels of society. Costs are now whirling out of control,
thanks in large part to historical suppression policies, climate change, and
the booming WUI. Our nation’s wilderness lands are disappearing, and res-
idents continue to be financially incentivized to exacerbate the problem.
E. Costs Are Higher than Ever and Climbing
Despite some disagreement about the degree and variety of causes
that have effectuated an increase in fire activity across the nation, one
WUI debate, the majority of timberland in the United States is owned by institutional
owners (defined as owning over 5000 acres). See id. at 465.
94 See id. at 463–64 (noting the overprotection of private property by the government and
the structure of private insurance policies).
95 See Study: Protecting Homes Drives Up Wildfire Costs, FLATHEAD BEACON (Aug. 21,
2008), http://www.flatheadbeacon.com/articles/article/study_protecting_homes_drives_up
_wildfire_costs/.
96 Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 463 (quoting OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003 66 (2002)).
97 2006 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 91, at i.
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thing is clear: this century, the federal government is spending more money
than ever on prevention, suppression, and recovery from wildland fire.98
The federal government has routinely spent over one billion dollars on fire
suppression alone throughout the past decade.99 Suppression costs have
not reached these heights in modern memory, and it does not appear that
the government will find a reprise of calmer fire seasons in the future.100
Though 2010 was calmer than most fire seasons in recent memory, 2011
activity is back to record heights, outpacing the ten-year average through
October of 2011.101
Fire suppression, however, is just the tip of the iceberg, and though
the Forest Service is the largest force in wildland firefighting, it is only one
of a number of federal agencies that perform wildland fire management
services.102 In analyzing the current state of wildfire costs, Ross Gorte,
Congressional Specialist in Natural Resources Policy, notes in his April
2010 report:
The acres burned annually have also increased over the
past 50 years, with the six highest totals in the past decade.
Many in Congress are concerned that wildfire costs are
spiraling upward without a reduction in damages. With
emergency supplemental funding, FY2008 wildfire fund-
ing was $4.46 billion, more than in any previous year.103
Even before this landmark year in fiscal year 2008, costs had been
raging out of control. In a June 2007 Government Accountability Office
report to Congress, Director of Natural Resources and Environment, Robin
M. Nazzaro, informed Congress that, “[o]ver the past decade, the number
98 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 3–6.
99 See A Brief History, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that the Forest Service alone, not includ-
ing Department of the Interior agencies who also have suppression budgets, spent over
one billion dollars on suppression in 2000, 2002, and 2003). This article was published
in July 2005 and therefore information beyond the 2004 fire season was not available.
100 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 4 (showing the rapidly increasing annual wildfire
expenditures of both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management). But see
Wildland Fire Summary and Statistics: Annual Report 2010, NAT’L INTERAGENCY
COORDINATION CTR. 6 (2010), available at http://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/intelligence
/2010_statssumm/intro_summary.pdf (noting that 2010 was a much calmer year com-
pared to the ten-year average, with lower numbers of total fires and acres burned).
101 See State of the Climate: Wildfires, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www
.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/fire (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
102 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 1.
103 Id. at Summary.
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of acres burned annually . . . has substantially increased. Federal appro-
priations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires . . . have almost
tripled.”104 Nazzaro went on to detail a plan for cost containment that
stresses interagency cohesiveness, but retains control at the federal level
amongst the many agencies that currently handle wildland fire preven-
tion and suppression.105
Federal wildland fire funding for these agencies is addressed in
the budget by four categories and thus four separate payment accounts:
preparedness, suppression and emergency funds, fuel reduction, and post-
fire rehabilitation.106 Each category has experienced fluctuation but aver-
aged growth during the last decade.107 Of these categories, fire suppression
is by far the most volatile, fluctuating wildly throughout the past decade
with the highest budgetary totals being recognized in the year immedi-
ately following an extreme fire season.108 Enormous and unexpected sup-
pression costs have forced federal agencies to borrow money from other
programs in the past, leading the federal government to create an addi-
tional “FLAME”109 account to serve as an emergency fire suppression
fund.110 Overall, increased fire has led to massively increased funding,
yet has failed to reduce damages.111 While the average federal wildfire ex-
penditures from 1994 to 1999 were $1.1 billion, they averaged $3.4 billion
from 2004 to 2009.112 Perhaps of most concern is the fact that there is es-
sentially no cap on suppression funds, as monies will be shifted from other
programs or other federal agencies to meet whatever price tag is neces-
sary to fulfill suppression policies on large fires.113
104 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1017T, WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT: A
COHESIVE STRATEGY AND CLEAR COST-CONTAINMENT GOALS ARE NEEDED FOR FEDERAL
AGENCIES TO MANAGE WILDLAND FIRE ACTIVITIES EFFECTIVELY 3 (2007) [hereinafter
GAO 2007].
105 See id. at 4–9.
106 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 5–8.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 5–7.
109 See id. at 7; see also Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 501, 123 Stat. 2904 (2009).
110 GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 7.
111 See id. at 12–13 (explaining that total acreage burned rises along with suppression
costs, showing that higher cost does not necessarily mean greater effectiveness).
112 Id. at 12. The greater the expenditure that federal agencies are forced to make on wild-
fire suppression, the less discretionary funds will be available to those agencies (like the
Forest Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs) to use for other positive improvements
for the federal lands that each agency manages. See id. at 13.
113 Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 459–60; see also infra Part III.
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II. STATE AND LOCAL WILDFIRE COST STRUCTURE
Technically, states and local governments are responsible for fire
suppression on all non-federal lands.114 This division has often placed fed-
eral firefighting crews in difficult situations, depending on the stringency
for which agencies will adhere to this policy.115 Even in the heat of an
extreme fire season, there is much uncertainty about where a fire might
spring up, often leaving some fire crews and resources unoccupied while
others are in desperate need of manpower somewhere else in the
country.116 For the sake of domestic wildfire efficiency, it is important to
have some degree of coordination between state, local, and federal fire
resources, considering it is often difficult to quickly transport the neces-
sary crews and equipment across the country.117 With some states con-
stantly strapped for money, wildfire programs are beginning to feel the
heat,118 and are often led to rely on aid from the federal government.119
States are paying an enormous price for wildfire damage,120 and it
does not stop with the suppression costs they are forced to shell out.121 In
fact, in a recent study done by the Western Forestry Leadership Coalition,
suppression costs made up just a range of three percent to fifty-three per-
cent of total costs associated with a single large wildfire, depending on its
severity, location, and other surrounding circumstances.122 This study
114 GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 19.
115 See id. at 20 n.33 (noting an instance where two private homes were burned as fire-
fighters from the Bureau of Indian Affairs sat idly by and watched, forced into inaction
by jurisdictional demands).
116 See 1995 POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW, supra note 7, at 29.
117 See id. at 29–32.
118 See Kevin O’Leary, Can Budget-Strapped California Afford More Wildfires?, TIME
(Sept. 7, 2009), available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1920815,00.html.
119 See id.; see also GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 19 (stating that federal assistance to
state wildfire programs has risen throughout the past decade, peaking in 2009 (the last
year for which data is available) at $314 million); Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 456–58
(noting the difficulty and lack of current system to prioritize which resources are to be
protected first by coordinated federal resources).
120 See 2011 is the Most Expensive Wildfire Season on Record, CONNECTAMARILLO.COM
(Sept. 7, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.connectamarillo.com/news/story.aspx?id=660557. “The
Texas Forest Service said Wednesday that fighting wildfires have cost an estimated $61.5
million in the last few months alone. That’s on top of $121 million lawmakers gave the
agency in June to help pay for wildfires earlier this spring.” Id. (noting the uncertainty
in federal assistance grants).
121 See W. FORESTRY LEADERSHIP COAL., THE TRUE COST OF WILDFIRE IN THE WESTERN
U.S. 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter TRUE COST OF WILDFIRE].
122 Id. at 5.
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includes property damage, loss of commerce, rehabilitation costs, and
resulting medical costs.123 In 2003, this report estimated the “true” cost
of just one large California wildfire at over $1.2 billion,124 while that year
California’s wildfire agency recorded $252.3 million in suppression costs
and $974 million in total damage costs for the entire fire season.125 When
costs do not make it into state and local accountings, they are often dis-
persed through other government programs and absorbed by the localities
decimated from wildfire damage.126 This information shows that the costs
to the victim states, localities, and individuals are already severe, and they
will surely rise along with increasing numbers and intensity of wildfires.
Though fire damage to homes and business along the WUI can be
catastrophic, if home and business owners are lucky enough to avoid
direct fire damage, they can potentially profit from the influx of federal
money to the area.127 With sometimes as many as 3000 firefighters on a
single fire, traveling private contractors, local restaurants, and even local
landowners often profit from renting land to set up base camps and
contracting with federal agencies for food sales and other services like
laundry.128 Wildfires can bring so much commerce to an area that one lo-
cal businessman nearby a large fire was lead to comment that “[wildfire]
brings this almost wartime funding machine into place.”129
Though some select entrepreneurial individuals are profiting from
wildfire, state and local governments in states with high fire activity are
left with an extreme burden, as evidenced by California’s exacerbated
budgetary issues due to raging wildfire costs.130 Some states seek natural
123 Id. at 3–5.
124 Id. at 5.
125 See CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., CDF 2003 FIRE SEASON SUMMARY 1 (2005),
available at http://www.fire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/fact_sheets/2003summary
final.pdf.
126 See TRUE COST OF WILDFIRE, supra note 121, at 3–12.
127 See Bettina Boxall & Julie Cart, As Wildfires Get Wilder, the Costs of Fighting Them are




130 See O’Leary, supra note 118. In the event of large, disaster level fire, the burden is
placed to a greater degree on the federal government with federal assistance grants for
direct suppression, Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) support funding,
and even military assistance when necessary, leaving the discussion of cost allocation
between the state and federal governments to be determined by no exact guidelines after
the fact. See generally ROSS W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22744, CALIFORNIA
WILDFIRES AND FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 1–2 (2007).
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catastrophe insurance coverage to insulate from exceedingly large wild-
fire costs, but even this insurance can be preemptively expensive and
place a large burden on state budgets.131 Unlike the federal government,
however, states and localities can seek federal assistance with fire sup-
pression costs. Through the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
(“FEMA”) “Fire Management Assistance Grant Program,” FEMA will pay
for seventy-five percent of a state or locality’s wildfire suppression costs
if FEMA deems the fire to be a “threat of major disaster.”132 Ultimately,
though state and local wildfire agencies perform much preventative and
reactionary work, the final burden in funding wildfire fighting lies with
the federal government.
III. FEDERAL AND STATE COST CONTROVERSY
Because wildfires know no political boundaries, they often sweep
across the federal lands of many different agencies, state lands, and private
land.133 This fact raises many questions: Should cost be based on where
the fire started? How it started? Should it be based on the percentage of
burned area or resources used? And, perhaps most importantly, who is
to bear the greatest burden in protecting the WUI?
Not one of these factors is determinative of who bears the primary
costs of wildfire suppression, although all of these factors go into a discus-
sion between the heads of all the various agencies involved to determine
cost structure for each fire individually.134 Sometimes agencies choose to
divide total costs based on acreage burnt, and sometimes the calculation
is much more specific, but without a consistent cost calculation, it is even
more difficult for federal and state agencies alike to concentrate on cost
containment, as it is unclear to the firefighters on the ground actively bat-
tling the inferno what ramifications their decisions may have on eventual
total cost.135
131 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-568R, NATURAL CATASTROPHE
INSURANCE COVERAGE 2 (2010).
132 Fire Management Assistance Grant Program: Overview, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY (Aug. 11, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/fmagp/index
.shtm (describing the grant application process as a fluid process that takes only a few
hours with a written request from a state governor after the state has met a delineated
threshold amount in funding the fire suppression).
133 See generally TRUE COST OF WILDFIRE, supra note 121.
134 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-570, WILDLAND FIRE SUPPRESSION:
LACK OF CLEAR GUIDANCE RAISES CONCERNS ABOUT COST SHARING BETWEEN FEDERAL
AND NONFEDERAL ENTITIES 3 (2006) [hereinafter LACK OF GUIDANCE].
135 See id. (explaining that many federal and non-federal officials have difficulty deter-
mining a fair method of cost calculation that places an appropriate monetary burden on
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The cost of fire suppression has been firmly placed on the state
and federal agencies which are often charged with protecting the WUI
(public and private structures) from the spreading fires whose origins are
often in federal and state lands.136 Even so, the federal government has de-
clared the protection of privately owned structures, like homes, paramount
to federal fire suppression.137 “The anomalous result is that hundreds of
acres of timberland can be allowed to burn to save a single, unoccupied
home.”138 Bradshaw implies that by favoring the protection of residences,
the federal government is overlooking both the institutional landowners
of valuable timberland and the federal tax-paying population as a whole.139
With costs rapidly rising and the nation’s budgetary problems
providing no relief, it is important for future policy to fight all three of
the main causes of rising costs: climate change, past policy mistakes, and
the development of the WUI.140 Our nation’s fight against global warming
is very controversial and public,141 with wildfire representing only a small
piece of that debate. State and federal wildfire agencies are constantly
fighting to undo the mistakes they made in land and fire management over
the course of the twentieth century.142 Despite knowledge of its effects,
the final cause, the growth of the WUI, is not being combated at all.143
Instead, the federal and state governments are subsidizing home-building
along the interface by providing fire protection services at no cost to the
homeowner, insulating the homeowner from consideration of the danger
each respective agency). The report also notes that FEMA reimbursement for non-federal
agencies can be a powerful bargaining chip for federal agencies to convince non-federal
agencies to take on a greater portion of the costs with seventy-five percent reimburse-
ment in mind. See id. at 14. Bradshaw suggests that the essentially uncapped federal
wildfire suppression budget financially incentivizes the firefighters to let the fire grow.
See Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 459–60. This analysis, however, fails to take into account
the non-economic moral, protective incentives of the firefighters in charge.
136 See LACK OF GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at 5.
137 See Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 455–56.
138 Id. at 456.
139 See id.
140 See GAO 2007, supra note 104, at 3–4 (concurring that the three main causes of the
rising cost of wildfire are development, climate, and overgrowth).
141 See Global Warming Controversy, SCIENCE DAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles
/g/global_warming_controversy.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
142 See A Brief History, supra note 20, at 3.
143 See 2006 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 91, at ii (“[The Forest Service’s] suppression costs
are likely to continue to rise as the number of homes in the WUI increase because current
public expectations and uncertainties about protection responsibilities compel FS to sup-
press fires aggressively and at great expense when private property is at risk, even when
fires pose little threat to national forest system land.”). Id.
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of living in high fire danger areas.144 In order to protect our nation’s
wilderness, slow the spread of urban sprawl, reduce the financial pres-
sure on state and federal government, and apply costs fairly to those
benefitting, it is time to adopt a new wildfire policy based on homeowners
paying the true cost of living in the WUI.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The focus of this Note is to find a feasible method of public financing
that will shift a greater proportion of the costs of battling wildland fire
on those who choose to develop and inhabit the WUI, swelling the costs,
difficulty, and danger of fighting fire for federal, state, and local agencies.
The key to successful implementation is to create an incentive system that
will accomplish the goals mentioned throughout this Note: slow the intru-
sion of development on our nation’s wildernesses, restore forest health,
reduce the costs to our increasingly cash-strapped governments, and allo-
cate costs in a fair way to those receiving the benefit.
When considering a course of action, “[t]here are two basic questions
in environmental policy: ‘What is the right balance between environmental
protection and use?’ and ‘How do we induce economic agents to use the
environment in a fashion that we have determined is desirable?’”145 Thus
far, this Note has described an imbalance of overuse taking precedence
over environmental protection, and the remainder of this Note will de-
scribe a system to induce a more desirable pattern of development that
respects the increased fire danger that the WUI creates.
In creating this policy, it is helpful to consider the efforts of
Congress in establishing the National Flood Insurance Program146
(“NFIP”) in 1968 when faced with a similar natural disaster issue,
massive flooding problems. Beginning as early as the 1920s, the federal
government began implementing policies aimed at slowing the increase
of the enormous costs associated with flood plain development.147 It was
144 See id. at i.
145 Sara Elizabeth Jensen, Policy Tools for Wildland Fire Management: Principles,
Incentives, and Conflicts, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 959, 962 (quoting CHARLES KOLSTAD,
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 28 (2000)).
146 See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006).
147 See Charles T. Griffith, Note, The National Flood Insurance Program: Unattained
Purposes, Liability in Contract, and Takings, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 727, 728–29 (1994)
(describing early methods of building flood walls, levees, and other capital projects aimed
at diverting water away from developing flood plains, ultimately resulting in a false sense
of security for residents and increased flood damage due to ineffectual technology).
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not until 1968, however, that the NFIP finally went into effect with the
dual intentions to provide relief to those residents whose homes were
damaged by floods and to deter future development of flood plains for the
sake of reducing recurring government and property owner recovery
costs.148 Today, Congress’s interests in wildfire relief should be largely
the same: to deter growth of the WUI, thus easing the rapid increase of
wildfire costs associated with defending development,149 but also not to
burden the individual homeowner with the costs associated with fire
damage to so great an extent as to drive a large percentage of WUI home-
owners out of their existing homes.150
The NFIP failed to deter development of flood plains; instead, by
creating a national insurance policy for landowners in flood plains it en-
couraged development in those areas.151 “Ironically, by conveying a sense
of security and federal approval, the NFIP has probably increased our vul-
nerability to floods in the U.S. by normalizing and thereby enabling flood
plain development—which has risen steadily every year since 1968.”152
Currently, the Forest Service and other federal, state, and local
wildfire authorities are repeating the mistakes of the NFIP by spending
a majority of their budget on direct defense of and fuel reduction around
the WUI.153 WUI homeowners typically are receiving these benefits with-
out paying a fair market price for the protection.154 Like the flood insur-
ance program, these services are creating a false sense of security for
homeowners and normalizing the dangers they subject themselves to by
living in the WUI. In seeking to reduce the government’s debt down the
line, it is imperative not to repeat the same mistakes of the NFIP.
148 Id. at 730–31. The program was initially introduced in the early 1950s by President
Truman, but, ironically, Congress refused to fund the Act for fear that it would only en-
courage greater development of flood plains. Id. at 729–730. As it turns out, Congress was
exactly right. Id. at 730.
149 See supra Part I.D.
150 See, e.g., Francine J. Lipman, Anatomy of a Disaster Under the Internal Revenue Code,
6 FLA. TAX REV. 953 (2005) (detailing the costs that a family faces, including money owed
to the unsympathetic IRS, after losing their home, many of their neighbors, and all of
their possessions).
151 See Griffith, supra note 147, at 730–31. The program did provide relief for existing
homeowners who could not get flood insurance at a reasonable rate because a relatively
small number of homes were at a high enough danger to desire flood insurance, and in-
surance companies could not spread the risk amongst a sufficiently high volume of policies.
See id. at 732.
152 Colburn, supra note 73, at 242.
153 See id. at 242–43; supra Part I.D; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
154 See Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 463–65.
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A. Potential Applications of Funding
While the NFIP provides an example of what NOT to do, policy
makers are left to create a solution to our burgeoning wildfire problems
that will not backfire in ways similar to the NFIP. “A policy can provide
a strong disincentive by creating a complex network of rules and regu-
lations for [developers] to navigate, [but] . . . an even stronger disincentive
is created when [an] activity is explicitly forbidden, especially when accom-
panied by the threat of economic or other sanctions.”155 With this guidance
in mind, the options listed below consider administrative and economic
policy tools to create effective policy.
In order to simplify the legislative possibilities, this Note will ana-
lyze potential policies for implementation in four separate categories,
ranging from the highest expenditure and highest expected effectiveness
(Option 1) to a lower threshold level of expenditure and expected effective-
ness (Option 4). Each category will require a different level of government
to act to implement the policy; these actions will be analyzed at the con-
clusion of Part IV. Variations and hybrids of the four options are plausible
as well.
1. Option 1: National Wildfire Suppression and Prevention Fund
The best-case scenario to accomplish the four goals156 men-
tioned throughout this Note would be to create a national account funded
through landowner payments that vary in percentage based on an as-
sessment of property value and average fire danger for each specific
parcel or community,157 giving payment breaks to communities or parcels
in full compliance with specific risk mitigation practices.158 A portion of
155 Jensen, supra note 145, at 963 n.14.
156 See supra Introduction.
157 Measuring wildfire risk can be difficult and assessments will be highly disputed in the
face of accompanying economic costs. See Geoffrey H. Donovan, Patricia A. Champ & David
T. Butry, Wildfire Risk and Housing Prices: A Case Study from Colorado Springs, 83 LAND
ECON. 217, 217–18 (2007). But federally accepted risk assessment methods are already
in place. See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at Summary. Still, new legislation will need to
settle on a uniform system of risk assessment for effective implementation of this policy.
158 See Getting Public Involvement in Wildfire Hazard Mitigation, 111 FIRE SCI. BRIEF, June
2010, at 1–3, available at http://www.firescience.gov/projects/briefs/05-3-2-05_FSBrief111
.pdf (outlining various local practices adopted to create more fire safe homes and structures
in the WUI); see also Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 462 (“[S]ome states impose increased
liability against wildland-urban interface owners who do not engage in appropriate veg-
etation clearing practices.”).
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the funds in the account would be distributed amongst existing local, state,
and federal wildfire agencies that provide preventative and rehabilitative
services to local, state, and federally owned wilderness land along the
WUI.159 It is these interface areas that such a high percentage of pre-
vention costs are devoted to already.160 Fund dispersal would be flexible
enough to allow states and localities to use a portion of the funds col-
lected to create new wildfire agencies where appropriate.
While efforts have unsuccessfully been made in the past to ramp
up prevention spending in hopes of reducing suppression costs,161 pre-
vention methods like mechanical cutting, prescribed burning, and cre-
ation of fire breaks are still revered as the most effectual methods of
wildfire prevention.162
The account created would not only distribute funds for this type
of wildfire prevention and forest health maintenance, it would retain the
greatest proportion of funds to create a wildfire suppression fund that
would be used in state and national suppression efforts with strong im-
pacts on the WUI or likely ignition from the WUI.163
Creation of this type of account would bill real property owners di-
rectly for the risks created by development in the WUI; it would increase
state and national agencies’ budgets for prevention and rehabilitation of
forest health; it would deter excessive, irresponsible development along
159 Bradshaw suggests that because the government offers little protection for institu-
tional landowners’ timberland, these private landowners are often the most individually
prepared for preventing and controlling wildfire on their own property. See Bradshaw,
supra note 90, at 465–66.
160 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 17 (“The proportion of fuel treatments in the WUI
has increased since FY2001 . . . , from 37% . . . to about 60% from FY2003 to FY2006 . . . ,
and 70% in FY2008.”).
161 The Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 (“HFRA”) heavily advocated and in-
creased funding for national prevention efforts, but results have been limited. See Jensen,
supra note 145, at 968; see GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 16–18 (describing the increased
fuel treatment efforts—primarily thinning and prescribed burning—over the last two
decades, and noting that there is little empirical evidence to show that these efforts have
reduced the rapid increase of wildfire suppression costs seen over those same two decades).
162 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 18. Gorte points out the difficulty of extracting infor-
mation on the effects of these fire treatments. See id. at 17–18. With increased prevention
funding stemming from the HFRA, total acreage treated per year has stabilized at just
less than three million acres. Id. at 16. At this level, it would take the Forest Service and
Department of the Interior twenty-five years to treat all lands at “high risk.” Id.
163 Persons directly responsible for ignition of a wildfire can be liable for the ultimate
damage and costs of suppression in many states. See Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 475.
Under the proposed system, these laws would remain in effect, but this type of “cost
recovery” typically only yields four to six million dollars a year, hardly making a dent in
national suppression costs. See id.
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our nation’s wildernesses by raising the costs of WUI construction, and
it would provide increased physical protection for existing structures with-
out making the federal government infinitely liable through a mandated
insurance program, like the NFIP.164
2. Option 2: National Wildfire Suppression Fund
Because of the potential difficulties that legislators would face
from political and constituent opposition to creation of such a large fund,
a more conservative option would be to limit the fund to directly paying
for suppression of wildfires involving the WUI, leaving prevention and
rehabilitative costs to the budgets of existing governmental agencies.
Depending on the degree of cost that the government is willing to place
on the reckless WUI homeowner, this fund could serve as an overflow
fund, or as the primary funding for wildfire suppression in the WUI.
If the government chooses to act more conservatively through cre-
ation of an overflow account, the account would be very similar to the cur-
rent FLAME account originally created in 2009.165 The FLAME account
was created to help government agencies avoid cutting other programs
or borrowing from other accounts in order to fund wildfire suppression.166
The FLAME account can be used as overflow in standard federal wildfire
suppression actions, with no increased limitations on the use of FLAME
funds to defend private lands.167
In fiscal year 2010 the FLAME fund was financed at $474 million
($413 million for the Forest Service and $61 million for the Department of
the Interior), but in fiscal year 2011, the requests for funding were smaller,
$387 million ($291 million for the Forest Service and $96 million for the
164 As Ross Gorte points out in his report to Congress, a similar mandated insurance
program for properties at high risk for wildfire has been suggested by some. See GORTE
2010, supra note 13, at 20. Without such a program, many property owners without private
insurance or with insurance that covers structure fire, but not wildfire, will be left with
nothing after a wildfire has burned through their community. See id. Such devastating
costs to citizens should never go without consideration when government implements
related legislation, but the purpose of this Note is to encourage developers and home-
owners to recognize the risk potential of inhabiting the WUI before disaster strikes.
165 See Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-88, § 501, 123 Stat. 2904 (2009).
166 See id. § 502(c) (“The FLAME Funds shall be available to cover the costs of large or
complex wildfire events and as a reserve when amounts provided for wildfire suppression
and Federal emergency response in the Wildland Fire Management appropriation accounts
are exhausted.”).
167 See id. § 502(e)(3).
620 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:595
Department of the Interior).168 Though the federal government also cre-
ated an additional account of contingency reserve funds, a very conserva-
tive estimate for the creation of a WUI suppression fund would begin
within this range of funding.169 The ultimate decision on funding this
national suppression account would be based on annual taxes assessed
on WUI properties. The assessment rate would be left to the legislature
to determine a fixed or variable value.
Even a relatively small account value could have a great effect in
achieving some of this Note’s stated goals. A fund solely dedicated to wild-
fire suppression costs would have a great effect in improving the overall
forest health of the nation’s wilderness. But, creation of such a fund would
disincentivize sprawl through increased annual costs to live in the WUI
and, depending on implementation strategies, possible additional costs
like fees or assessments to build new construction in the WUI. The sup-
pression fund would more accurately allocate costs to the WUI owners
receiving the benefits of WUI wildfire suppression. Finally, the suppres-
sion fund would achieve the goal of reducing the burden on federal and
state governments to fight wildland fire and protect the WUI.
3. Option 3: State Wildfire Funds
Implementing similar suppression funds to the National Sup-
pression Fund suggested in Option 2 in each state substantially affected
by wildfire may be a more simple solution to implement, but participation
across the board would be difficult to achieve. Because the power to tax
real property is vested in the states,170 it would follow that any type of tax
to be assessed on properties in a specific area, in this case the WUI, would
be best implemented by the states. As long as states can receive aid from
the federal government for large wildfire suppression costs,171 however,
they will be reluctant to increase their share of funding wildfire costs, in
effect accepting the greater responsibility for wildfire management.172
While a state’s voting populace may be more likely to accept increased
costs along with a promise of greater prevention efforts, forest health
restoration, and more vigorous direct action like more state funded initial
168 See GORTE 2010, supra note 13, at 7.
169 See id. The contingency fund requests for fiscal year 2011 totaled $357 million, $282
million for the Forest Service and $75 million for the Department of the Interior. Id.
170 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
171 See supra Parts II & III.
172 See generally O’Leary, supra note 118.
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attack crews, it seems quite unlikely that large-scale improvements would
be accepted at cost across a majority of states. States will be reluctant to
pass these costs onto their citizens when the federal government has
shown its willingness to finance suppression costs in certain instances.
Implementation on the state level would create jurisdictional
problems as well, for wildfires do not cease at state lines,173 and each
year’s weather brings a different burn pattern, more heavily affecting
different states every year.174 State level implementation would be less
flexible than a national program that could divert resources to the varied
locations across the country that most desperately need suppression
resources in a given year.
4. Option 4: State and Local Prevention Funds
Localities that are the most affected by wildfire will be more likely
to adopt programs that increase the costs directly placed on citizens than
will entire states in which a smaller percentage of the population is di-
rectly benefitting from wildfire programs. Various localities across the
country in fire-prone areas have already taken action in a number of
ways, choosing to finance programs aimed at prevention, education, risk
assessment and management, and other preemptive methods.175 Some
localities have gone as far as “self-imposing” local taxes and ordinances
that mandate programs and funding for vegetation removal and the cre-
ation of buffer zones between vegetation and structures.176
Option 4 contemplates this and similar programs, already in place
in many areas, in which localities, larger regions, or states establish leg-
islation and policies that support micro-scale wildfire prevention. Such
173 See generally TRUE COST OF WILDFIRE, supra note 121.
174 See Kevin Bonsor, How Wildfires Work: Weather’s Role in Wildfires, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://science.howstuffworks.com/nature/natural-disasters/wildfire2.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2012).
175 See Margaret Reams et al., An Examination of State and Local Fire Protection
Programs in the Wildland-Urban Interface, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON FIRE ECONOMICS, PLANNING, AND POLICY: A GLOBAL VIEW, supra note 88,
at 495, 497. This article concludes by noting that ultimate success depends largely on
budgetary constraints, policy of larger governmental units, and community support. See
id. at 503.
176 See Lara Cooper, City Council Gives Vote of Support for Wildfire Suppression Program,
NOOZHAWK (May 25, 2010), http://www.noozhawk.com/article/052510_santa_barbara
_wildfire_suppression/ (describing a locality-wide program focused on ladder fuel, or
vegetation, removal, especially around structures, in order to minimize damages in the
event of wildfire, a frequent occurrence in this locale).
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programs would include property maintenance requirements and the
creation of homeowner-funded programs that would hire third parties to
inspect, cut, and clear excess vegetation from public and private lands in
a community.177 Though properties in the WUI may be singled out and
charged through these methods, the costs of small-scale programs may
not provide significant deterrence to irresponsible WUI development, and
the programs may be aimed more at sustaining development than at cre-
ating responsible growth patterns.178 Such policies, focused on existing
home protection, are to be expected from those already living in the WUI,
naturally motivated to protect their home and way of life. Still, as the
study mentioned above shows, even programs aimed at education and
prevention can have a substantial effect on a consumer’s willingness to
move into an area with high wildfire risk.179
Option 4 is a very attainable option, but participation in this option
would vary based on locality lines. While aspects of the varied programs
implemented at the local level may restore forest health to a degree and
reduce suppression costs in the WUI, Option 4’s effects would be limited
as it would not necessarily be adopted by widespread localities, it may do
more to encourage development than discourage it, and it would do noth-
ing to reallocate the major suppression costs associated with large fires.
B. Federal Legislation Is the Most Desirable Option
While the effects of property damage are felt most heavily by in-
dividuals at the local level, the governmental financial effects of wildfire
legislation would be felt primarily at the federal level. Because wildfire
creates such a daunting burden on the federal government, if large-scale
relief is to occur, it is most likely to originate at the federal level, the body
set to see the largest savings.
According to the criteria set out in this Note, federal action would
have the greatest effect in accomplishing the goals set out by this Note.
177 See Bradshaw, supra note 90, at 462 (stating that private WUI owners typically only
have “ex-ante obligations” for wildfire prevention, if any).
178 At least one study suggests that simple community and potential home-buyer edu-
cation of actual wildfire risk factor of a property can vastly change the potential home
buyer’s willingness to pay for a WUI home. The study concludes that an educated home
buyer is willing to pay $40,000 less than a home buyer without the benefit of wildfire risk
education. See Donovan et al., supra note 157, at 228–29.
179 See id. at 232. The final results of the study question whether this educational cam-
paign will have a lasting impact on encouraging home buyers to incorporate wildfire risk
factors into the equation when deciding what type of home and in what location to purchase.
See id.
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The most direct method of federal implementation would be based on
direct taxation of developed properties in what is designated the WUI,180
a method contemplated in Options 1 and 2 above. Since wildfire damage
to a community creates such extraordinary costs to that community—
economic and medical losses, rebuilding costs, loss of business, and so
forth—it would be very difficult to collect taxes to recoup suppression
costs from individuals, properties, or communities after fire damage has
occurred and various costs are already being felt; therefore, it is logical to
assess taxes based on a well-defined risk factor before the damage occurs,
allowing WUI land owners to pay for risk and not necessarily be respon-
sible for 100% of the suppression costs associated with protecting each
landowner’s own land or community.181
Unlike the NFIP, the goal of this program would not be to subsidize
insurance for homes and properties in the risk area,182 but rather to exact
a greater portion of the costs associated with the protection and manage-
ment that is already being provided to these properties. While legislation
would seek to minimize the detrimental effects to current WUI residents,
the primary goal of this legislation would not be property owner protec-
tion, it would be fair cost allocation.183 To implement either Option 1 or
Option 2 mentioned above, the key challenge will be drafting federal leg-
islation that does not interfere with state sovereignty or create too great
a burden on individual property owners that would drive people and fam-
ilies out of their homes.
180 If such a program were created, defining the WUI would certainly become a major
issue. One established definition came in the HFRA. The HFRA defines the WUI as “an
area within or adjacent to an at-risk community . . . .” Healthy Forest Restoration Act of
2003, 16 U.S.C. § 6511(16)(A) (2006). The HFRA defines an “at-risk community” as “a group
of homes and other structures with basic infrastructure and services . . . within or adjacent
to Federal land; in which conditions are conducive to a large-scale wildland fire distur-
bance event . . . .” Id. §§ 6511(1)(A)–(B). This definition would leave a great deal of dis-
cretion to assessment agents charged with mapping out the WUI.
181 See TRUE COST OF WILDFIRE, supra note 121.
182 See Griffith, supra note 147, at 730.
183 While traditional insurance may not create a socially beneficial incentive system for
homeowners in the WUI, collaborative insurance programs that use an actuarial risk as-
sessment encouraging homeowner wildfire mitigation efforts may create a more cost-
effective and socially beneficial solution to homeowner wildfire insurance. See generally
Mariam Lankoande, Jonathan Yoder & Philip Wandschneider, Optimal Wildfire Insurance
in the Wildland-Urban Interface in the Presence of a Government Subsidy for Fire Risk
Mitigation (Sch. of Econ. Sci., Wash. State Univ., Working Paper No. 2005-9, 2005),
available at http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/Yoder/LankoandeEtAl_Insurance
SubsidiesWildfire_2005.pdf.
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1. The National Wildfire Protection Fund
If implemented at the federal level, creation of a wildfire protection
fund to supplement the budget currently afforded the Department of the
Interior and the Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service) will be
quite complex. For the sake of this article, such an act of Congress that
would implement Option 1 or Option 2 will hypothetically be known as the
National Wildfire Protection Act (“NWPA”). The challenge for Congress
would be to fit a federal tax on property into our nation’s legal framework.
For NWPA legislation to be constitutional, Congress must cite the
specific power that allows it to levy a tax based on a percentage risk fac-
tor of fire danger for each specific parcel of land within the WUI.184 To do
so, NWPA should cite specific concerns of safety and general welfare185
that are protected by this act.186 Continuing to use the NFIP as a model,
Congress would create a program that withholds federal wildfire pro-
tection of any type, including any additional preventative or suppression
services contemplated to be provided by the new NWPA funding, from
non-participating communities, unless those communities participate in
the NWPA.187
The legislation would be drafted so as to assess costs as a function
of the level of wildfire risk of a property or community and the value of the
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
185 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
186 See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2011). The NFIP outlines
its purpose clearly, as follows:
(a) Necessity and reasons for flood insurance program[.] The Congress
finds that (1) from time to time flood disasters have created personal
hardships and economic distress which have required unforeseen di-
saster relief measures and have placed an increasing burden on the
Nation’s resources; (2) despite the installation of preventive and pro-
tective works and the adoption of other public programs designed to
reduce losses caused by flood damage, these methods have not been suf-
ficient to protect adequately against growing exposure to future flood
losses; (3) as a matter of national policy, a reasonable method of sharing
the risk of flood losses is through a program of flood insurance which
can complement and encourage preventive and protective measures;
and (4) if such a program is initiated and carried out gradually, it can
be expanded as knowledge is gained and experience is appraised, thus
eventually making flood insurance coverage available on reasonable
terms and conditions to persons who have need for such protection.
Id. § 4001(c).
187 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
2012] WE DIDN’T START THE FIRE 625
parcel in its present condition. This formula would provide some protection
to lower income communities and residents in the WUI, aiming to increase
funding without forcing families in the area into sale or foreclosure. The
NWPA would also offer a break in payment for properties that comply
with a slate of “Firewise” conditions in the upkeep of the property: keeping
a buffer zone around the home and minimizing the level of excess brush
and vegetation by periodically clearing leaves, saplings, and other ladder
fuels from the property, implementing aspects of Option 4, as described
above, into a national program.188 Incentivizing large-scale participation
in micro-prevention tactics should mitigate the costs of direct home de-
fense from wildfire.189
While the law would go into effect immediately for any new con-
struction, and include a registration and risk assessment process, a buffer/
assessment period would be given to existing homeowners in order to max-
imize notice of the shift in costs. Although this legislation would stand a
strong chance to accomplish the goals set out in this Note—to defer costs
from the government to property owners and developers, to protect and
possibly institute additional federal wildfire programs that support res-
toration of forest health, to ease the budgetary obligations of state and
federal wildfire agencies, and to deter irresponsible development of the
WUI, the legislation will certainly face political and judicial challenges
along the way.
2. The Federalism Roadblock
Land management is a power generally left to the states.190 The
federal government allows states the exclusive power to levy direct prop-
erty taxes on the value of real property191 in its present form and on the
underlying parcel. So, the federal government must find a way, without
directly taxing private properties in the WUI, to assess costs on WUI
landowners and create a direct income stream for the NWPA to increase
wildfire management funding, or, in the alternative, induce the states to
increase their income streams for wildfire funding from WUI properties
across the board.
One key to drafting NWPA legislation will be avoiding any state
claims of sole sovereignty over private property taxation. Again, it is useful
188 See generally Reams et al., supra note 175.
189 See generally id.
190 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
191 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 75 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-101 (2010).
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to turn to the NFIP for comparison. The federal government’s power to
implement this program was challenged in Texas Landowners Rights
Association v. Harris.192
In response to low enrollment at the outset of the NFIP, the fed-
eral government enacted the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973.193
Sections 102 and 202 of the Act deny federal assistance or federally related
financing by private lending institutions for acquisition or construction
of properties within participating or eligible communities of the NFIP,
unless the property is covered by national flood insurance.194 The plaintiffs
challenged this provision as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, claiming
that the federal government is usurping local land use power through the
adoption of this program.195 While the plaintiffs argued that the federal
program does not present an actual choice for communities to participate,
but rather an “illusory” choice,196 the court ruled that a “carrot and a stick”
inducement for state action is constitutional, so long as the federal leg-
islation presents a choice to the states.197 The court held that the deter-
mination of whether an actual choice exists is NOT based on a balancing
test between “the severity of the sanctions” and “the discretion left with
the States.”198
The court affirmed the federal government’s power under the
General Welfare Clause199 as “a grant of power, the scope of which is
quite expansive,”200 and noted that Congress did a more than adequate
job in setting out the national issues that demonstrated a need for a plan
for national flood insurance.201 The court went on to say that, “the federal
government usually attracts voluntary state compliance . . . ‘by offering
the states a sufficiently attractive incentive or by threatening to with-
draw a federal benefit they are presently receiving.’ ”202
192 Tex. Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978).
193 Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975.
194 See id. §§ 102, 202.
195 See 453 F. Supp. at 1027–28.
196 See id. at 1029.
197 See id. at 1030.
198 Id.
199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and
general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.”).
200 453 F. Supp. at 1030 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976)).
201 See id.; see supra text accompanying note 171.
202 453 F. Supp. at 1031 (quoting District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 993 n.26
(D.C. Cir. 1975)).
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With the NFIP and the Flood Disaster Protection Act as guidance,
Congress could draft legislation for the implementation of the NWPA (in
the form of Option 1 or Option 2) that mirrors the drafting of these two acts.
The NWPA would be based upon an optional program that des-
ignates graded WUI “risk” areas within each state, just like the flood
zone risk areas in the NFIP.203 The program would predicate continued
federal preventative and suppression labor and financial assistance within
non-federal in-state lands, the availability of FEMA wildfire reimburse-
ment plans, and the additional preventative/suppression services created
by increased funding on state and local acceptance of a WUI property
ownership-based funding of the new national wildfire protection fund.
Like the flood insurance program, the government is offering a benefit
under the General Welfare Clause that, even though the lack of which is
very unattractive, gives states and localities the choice between paying
for and receiving federal wildfire protection or relying solely on state and
local agencies. Though localities are likely to subscribe to the NWPA, even
a choice to opt out of the program may reduce the federal government’s bur-
den of suppression and prevention costs in that area, necessitating states
not in compliance with the Act to expand their state wildfire services.
Ultimately, mirroring the NFIP will give the NWPA the best chance to
withstand challenges on federalism grounds and ensure voluntary local
participation or provide the catalyst for states to take their own initiative.
3. Takings Clause Issues
In Texas Landowners Rights Association above, challenging na-
tional flood insurance, the plaintiffs not only challenged the law under the
Tenth Amendment on federalism grounds, they disputed the government
regulation on their property as going so far as becoming a taking under
the Fifth Amendment.204 They claimed that the federal program devalued
the land subject to the program to such a great extent so as to be considered
a taking.205 With the implementation of the Flood Disaster Prevention
Act, the government went beyond the simple choice of participation in the
program, and placed building and construction limitations on properties
in the subject area that do not opt into the federal insurance program.206
203 See Griffith, supra note 147, at 733.
204 See 453 F. Supp. at 1027, 1031.
205 See id. at 1031.
206 Id. at 1027–28; see 42 U.S.C. § 4012a (2006).
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The court held that, “[w]hen the government acts to protect the
safety and welfare of the community, generally no taking or appropri-
ation is found. . . . As a matter of policy the Court has been reluctant to
find governmental takings where the action challenged is shown to be
related to a legitimate public interest.”207 Since this case was decided in
1978, however, takings litigation has progressed to a significant degree,
and the NWPA would be unwise to rely solely on this language for safe
harbor. Still, as a government program that encourages participation
through incentives and does not physically infringe upon property nor
take property completely away from a landowner, the NFIP would likely
not be considered a taking under regulatory takings law.208
Though a regulatory taking may be a “hard sell,” situations may
arise where the additional burden of a wildfire protection fund payment
would make individual landowners unable to maintain ownership in their
property. For that matter, if the NWPA were to incorporate similar re-
strictions on construction, individual scenarios in which a court may find
a “total taking”209 or “temporary taking”210 may become more probable. For
the sake of avoiding governmental liability and protecting the rights of
existing residents in the WUI, it is important to include stipulations in
the law that protect low-income homeowners from excessive fees, likely
through income graded payments and the allowance of a grace period for
existing property owners. Similarly, to avoid takings litigation, implemen-
tation of the NWPA must avoid singling out individual properties in an
area by applying uniform costs to communities whenever possible to avoid
equal protection and takings claims.211
207 453 F. Supp. at 1031–32.
208 See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
307, 370–71 (2007). Meltz writes,
We know from decades of decisional law that a Penn Central claim is
a difficult sell—i.e., that the economic impact factor in most courts is
not that much laxer than the total taking standard, and that the legal
landscape at the time of property acquisition is often pivotal, whether
or not background principles are involved.
Id. at 371.
209 See id. at 330–33 (describing what modern law may consider to be a “total taking” by
the Lucas standard).
210 See id. at 351–52.
211 See id. at 314–15, 315 n.31 (noting that equal protection and takings claims may
run together in cases in which a single property owner is relied upon to finance a reg-
ulatory burden).
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C. Option 3 Implementation: State-Level Targeted Taxation
Legislation
Success of the NWPA is likely predicated on its passing through
political oppositions and judicial challenges; however, if enacted into
law, the NWPA would be a strong step towards shifting realistic wildfire
costs to WUI property owners, easing the financial burden of wildfire man-
agement on the government, deterring irresponsible growth in the WUI,
and increasing funding towards prevention programs and restoration of
forest health.
In the event that Option 1 and/or Option 2 are unsuccessful,
Option 3 creates a plausible alternative to be enacted individually by
each state. States that see a high frequency of wildfire and/or high levels
of property damage in the WUI, like California, Colorado, Montana, Idaho,
Alaska, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, and others,212 would be excellent candi-
dates for creating a state wildfire protection fund financed by WUI property
owners. Management of such a fund may prove difficult in the event of
a large fire that spans multiple states, complicating the already muddled
cost allocation process of wildland fire suppression.213
Realistically, however, it is likely not management difficulties or ju-
dicial challenges214 that will lead to Option 3’s failure, but politics. Despite
the positive environmental and fiscal impacts of a state wildfire protection
fund, legislatures and the voting public may simply be unwilling to enact
legislation that places a higher financial burden on their home state when
the status quo is so heavily financed by the federal government and gen-
eral tax dollars.215
D. Option 4 Implementation: Impact Fees, Special Assessments,
and Local Prevention-Focused Policy
Even if unwilling to shoulder a greater portion of suppression
costs, property owners in the WUI have proven their recognition of the
increasing danger that wildfire brings to their communities through
212 See 1997–2009 Large Fires (100,000+ Acres), NAT’L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., http://www
.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_lgFires.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
213 See supra Part III.
214 See supra Part IV.B.2. The same federalism challenges would not exist for state gov-
ernments enacting property-based taxes.
215 See supra Part III.
630 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:595
enactment of various localized, prevention-oriented programs.216 Option 4
seeks to expand these localized prevention programs across greater areas,
mandating compliance through more formal, well-publicized and action-
based programs.
While the goal of these programs is to “creat[e] effective wildfire
mitigation strategies to protect lives, property, and resources within de-
veloped communities and private holdings in wildland intermix areas,”217
expanding the scope of local programs and more frequently mandating
WUI property participation may also accomplish many of the goals dis-
cussed above with the NWPA. Currently, a large number of localities with
localized prevention programs use education as a key component of the
program.218 Education alone can serve to alter growth patterns by shifting
consumer home preferences away from high wildfire risk areas, topography,
and home site characteristics.219
Pairing regulatory programs and homeowner assistance with addi-
tional education and risk assessment programs can only serve to multiply
the educational effects on consumer risk aversion by creating greater ex-
posure of the public to the threat of wildfire in the WUI. Most prevention
programs of this type stem from local and county ordinances.220 It is the
California program, however, that serves as a supreme illustration of the
more expansive reach that Option 4 contemplates. California has adopted
defensible space regulations (reducing vegetation near structures) that
apply to WUI and high-risk areas across the entire state.221 Statewide leg-
islation like California’s is more sweeping and hence more likely than local
ordinances to increase awareness of wildfire risks, allocate more costs to
WUI landowners, and ideally reduce some costs to the government by re-
ducing the ignitability of private structures and properties along the WUI.
In order to induce states to adopt fire safe programs like this one,
members of Congress have proposed legislation that would increase the
level of FEMA funding for suppression costs to states, from seventy-five
percent to ninety percent, that implement statewide fire safety policies
216 See supra Part IV.A.4; see generally Terry Haines et al., The National Wildfire
Mitigation Programs Database: State, County, and Local Efforts to Reduce Wildfire Risk,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON FIRE ECONOMICS,
PLANNING, AND POLICY: A GLOBAL VIEW, supra note 88, at 505.
217 Haines et al., supra note 216, at 506.
218 See id. at 507.
219 See generally Donovan et al., supra note 157.
220 See Haines et al., supra note 216, at 508.
221 See id.
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or ordinances that comply with the National Fire Protection Association
Code.222 The notion of increasing federal responsibility for suppression
costs from general funds is in contrast with the thesis of this Note, but
legislators must use ideas like this to strike a balance between wildfire
suppression today and forest health maintenance and wildfire prevention
for the future.
Congress can use similar legislation to encourage states to man-
date responsible construction, planning, and maintenance of areas of high
wildfire risk.223 Community standards should include financial respon-
sibilities that go towards funding risk assessment, vegetation removal
(on public, private, residential, and commercial lands), defensible space
creation, and community education.
Localities can implement these practices and come into compli-
ance with state standards using a number of financing methods. Though
each state and locality may use different terms, an array of policy tools
are at the disposal of the locality to settle on a judicially acceptable meth-
od of raising capital.224 To best accomplish the purposes laid out in this
Note, special assessments and impact fees should be used by local gov-
ernments in order to transfer a realistic cost of wildfire protection to the
property owners living in high risk WUI areas.
Impact fees and exactions can be charged to a developer who must
apply for certain permits and building approvals with a locality.225 While
a locality may have existing projects that it intends to fund through
these methods, fire prevention has typically been a judicially accepted
222 See Fire Safe Communities Act of 2009, S. 762, 111th Cong. §§ 2(4) (2009) (naming
areas in which conformance would be required, including use of fire safe materials in new
construction, specifications for site and community design, defensible space requirements,
standards for infrastructure management, and many more).
223 See id.
224 See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth With Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 190 (2006). Rosenberg writes that:
Funds for local capital projects could be collected from one or more of the
following list: 1) intergovernmental transfers from the federal and/or state
government—grants, revenue sharing, and subsidies; 2) gifts from pri-
vate corporate, foundation, or individual benefactors; 3) taxes—property,
sales, income, special purpose, gasoline, excise, and real estate transfer
or recording; 4) bonds—general obligation or revenue; 5) special assess-
ments; 6) user charges; 7) special taxing districts revenues; and 8) land
use exactions, including development impact fees.
Id. Rosenberg goes on to clarify that in most localities only a few of these financing
methods are legally available. See id.
225 See Isla Verde Int’l Holdings v. City of Camas, 49 P.3d 867 (Wash. 2002).
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reason for charging an impact fee.226 Tacking the additional cost onto
development in the WUI whenever possible will help deter irresponsible
growth and increase awareness of the serious risk of wildfire.
Special assessments can be applied to existing developed proper-
ties and communities in order to fund a capital improvement for which
each property will see a benefit.227 As seen applied in Santa Barbara above,
special assessments can be used to essentially “tax” local residents for
the creation of a wildfire prevention fund.228 In this case, the fund was re-
sponsible for assessing risk and removing vegetation on both public and
private lands throughout the community.229
Though implementation of Option 4 risks encouraging the con-
tinued development of the WUI and does little to restore forest health or
encourage rehabilitation, it makes promising strides toward applying
wildfire costs directly to homeowners and reducing the long-term costs on
federal and state wildfire management agencies. Ultimate accomplish-
ment of these economic goals depends largely on the scale at which
Option 4 is implemented. Without widespread participation in ambitious
programs, however, total costs shifted will be minimal and development
incentives will be negligible. To create a positive incentive system for
responsible development, protect our wildlands, and insulate govern-
ment agencies from spiraling costs, action should be taken at the federal
level, mandating pervasive changes in the United States’ relationship
with wildfire.
226 See Rosenberg, supra note 224, at 182 n.19 (listing fire protection as one of a list of
typical infrastructure improvements funded through impact fees). But see id. at 247
(citing S. Nev. Homebuilders Ass’n v. City of N. Las Vegas, 913 P.2d 1276, 1278–79 (Nev.
1996), which held that fire prevention services were not included in the statutory list of
“capital improvement” projects to be funded in Nevada by impact fees).
227 See id. at 204 (noting that the difference between different financing methods may be
in name only; localities have distinct rules for what types of citizen financing will be
available). Rosenber writes,
This is an area where labels matter and the judicial categorization of
a financial charge placed on land development as a tax, a special
assessment, or a development impact fee can be determinative in de-
termining lawfulness. In a particular state context, one of these devices
may be authorized and available to the locality, while another tech-
nique may not.
Id.
228 See Cooper, supra note 176.
229 See id.
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CONCLUSION
A once heroic battle230 against an unquestioned enemy, the United
States’ relationship with wildfire has progressed into a circus-like bal-
ancing act, leveraging environmental concerns and future wildfire pro-
tection against development in the WUI and the assurance of human
safety through fire suppression. Financing this balancing act is becoming
increasingly difficult in the face of three main causes, all showing no sign
of relief in the near future. Overgrowth in our forests created by past mis-
management is allowing fires to burn longer, more intensely, and to cover
greater areas;231 climate change is exacerbating this problem with early
snow melt, higher average temperatures, and drier forests;232 the en-
croachment of the WUI deeper into our wilderness lands is forcing state,
federal, and local agencies to expend greater portions of their budgets on
direct defense of WUI structures and wildfire prevention in the WUI, all
the while preventing prescribed fire or a “let it burn” policy and providing
WUI structures as kindling to wildfires spreading across the nation.
As these three factors drive wildfire management costs upward,
with the largest proportion of costs for direct wildfire suppression, state
and federal wildfire agencies are unable to even maintain the status quo
level of wildfire risk or wildfire expenditure from year to year. With the
promise of more intense and more expensive wildfire seasons in the future,
it is the federal government that will be counted on to finance large fire
suppression, not to mention other prevention and rehabilitation costs.
Currently, federal programs are fighting two of the three main causes of
increasing costs—trying to turn back the clock on historical forest fire
suppression through thinning, prescribed burning and other projects,233
and beginning a policy fight against global warming, even if not neces-
sarily BECAUSE of its effects on wildfire.234 It is time for federal action
to help fight the third main cause, the cause that is potentially the easiest
to regulate, the growth of the WUI.
This Note lays out four options for ways in which federal, state,
and local governments can act to achieve the four goals of this Note: fair
230 See PYNE, supra note 22, at 239.
231 See Dodge, supra note 47, at 139–40.
232 See Westerling et al., supra note 51, passim.
233 See A Brief History, supra note 20, at 3.
234 See 2009–2010 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE FORESTERS ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 60, at 14.
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cost allocation, encouraging responsible growth, reducing governments’
financial burden in wildfire management, and restoring forest health.
Accomplishment of these goals likely requires federal action, like the
proposed NWPA, as state and local governing bodies will not be willing
to voluntarily place a greater proportion of future, potentially massive sup-
pression and prevention costs on their constituents. Federal legislation
is imperative in creating a sustainable cost structure for financing wild-
land fire management, aimed primarily at creating realistic costs that
foster informed, responsible, and risk-conscious development of the WUI.
